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PROTEST BOYCOTTS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
Consumer activism charged with keen political feelings gave
rise to the "original" boycott of an English land agent by his Irish
tenants.' By contrast, the boycotts figuring prominently in American antitrust law have for the most part been strictly commercial
affairs, designed to extract a business advantage at the expense of
competitors. 2 In recent years, however, as social and political
activists have looked increasingly to the marketplace as a forum
for effective protest,3 the boycott has been adapted to a wide variety
of social and political purposes. 4 Remarkably, these activities have
induced only sparse litigation, perhaps because of an uncritical
but widely-shared belief that laws enacted for the protection of
free enterprise offer no relief against behavior that is essentially
political.5 As this de facto immunity to legal challenge recedes,
' Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott, a retired British army officer serving as
an estate manager in Ireland, refused in 1880 to reduce rents in response to demands
by the Irish Land League and served writs of eviction on his tenants. When, at
the urging of Charles Parnell, an Irish nationalist leader, Boycott's tenants refused
further dealings with him, the captain was obliged to import workers from Ulster
to harvest his crops under the guard of hundreds of soldiers. II ENCYCLOPAEnrA
BnTArmqcA 212 (15th ed. 1974).
2 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild
of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
3
See generally J. BEXIN & R. BAUBER, THE Noam WrLL RISE AGAI: PENi Tim 1980's (1978); Schwartz, The Public-Interest
SIONS, Porrics AN PowER
Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,69 MicHr. L. REv. 421, 422 (1971);
N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1978, at 1, col. 1 (survey showing shift by southern Blacks
from civil rights activism of 1960s to political and economic activism of 1970s).
4
E.g., Missouri v. NOW, 958 AN-=USr & TRADE BEG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (8th
Cir. Mar. 28, 1980) (convention boycott to press for ratification of Equal Rights
Amendment); Henry v. First Nat'1 Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980) (civil rights boycott of white merchants, seeking municipal
action to end racial discrimination); N.Y. Times News Service, Nov. 1, 1978, at 85
(microfiche) (National Federation for Decency's call for boycott of ABC-TV's
"sleazy sex" programming) (study of suggestive scenes and references over 15-week
period shows 1109 on ABC, 777 on CBS, and 547 on NBC programs); N.Y. Times,
Apr. 20, 1978, at 20, col. 6 (church-group support for consumer boycott of J.P.
Stevens & Co. textiles in response to illegal, antiunion practices); N.Y. Times, Mar.
9, 1978, at 18, col. 6 (anti-abortionist boycott of March of Dimes because of funding for prenatal diagnostic programs); N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1978, at 16, col. 2 (end
of farmworkers' boycott of iceberg lettuce, table grapes, and Gallo wine); N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1977, at 16, col. 6 (California Ku Klux Klan plan to "help whites"
by boycotting businesses unfriendly to Klan); N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1977, at 21, col 4
(homosexual organization's boycott of Florida citrus products in retaliation for antigay campaign of Anita Bryant); N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1973, at 28, col. 2 (consumer
boycott to protest high meat prices); Wall St. J.,Nov. 9, 1979, at 2 (refusal of
dockworkers to unload Iranian goods).
5 See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw.
U. L. REV. 705, 705-09 (1962).
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difficult problems of legal analysis are brought to the fore. Does use
of the boycott form subject protest activity to regulation under the
Sherman Act?

6

Or do the political purposes and symbolic qual-

ities of a protest boycott entitle it to protection by the first amendment? 7 And if protest boycotts fall within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws, how should they be treated? The answers
to these questions are of critical importance in a democratic society
because of the role they will play in defining the limits of permissible political activity.
Missouri v. National Organization for Women (NOW)," a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
vividly illustrates the difficulties these protest boycotts entail.
NOW launched in 1977 a campaign urging groups sympathetic to
the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 9 to boycott
convention sites within states that had not voted for ratification.
NOW's purpose in this undertaking was exclusively political-to
secure ratification of the ERA by the necessary three-fourths majority of the states.' 0 The campaign consisted of direct solicitation
by mailings, phone calls, and personal appearances. 1 By exchanging information with other groups also urging the boycott, NOW
had compiled in early 1978 a list of 110 organizations, cities, and
12
counties which purportedly had agreed to the convention boycott.
Because this effort was having a noticeable effect on Missouri
convention revenues, the state, claiming parens patriae standing,
sought to enjoin NOW's activities. Missouri charged that the boy6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See generally Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rev. 847 (1955); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of
Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 CoLum. L. Rev.
685 (1979); Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals
to Deal, 1970 Drue L.J. 247; Marcus, Civil Rights and the Antitrust Laws, 18
U. Cm. L. REv. 171 (1951); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws?, 27 RuT Rs L. REv. 773 (1974); Comment, Boycott: A Specific Definition Limits the Applicability of a Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U. L. Rev. 818 (1977);
Note, Use of Economic Sanctions by Private Groups: Illegality Under the Sherman
Act, 30 U. Cu. L. Rev. 171 (1962).
7 See generally Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91
HAmv. L. Rev. 659 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as Political Boycott Activity].

8 958 ANTRMUST & TRADE REc. REP. (BNA) F-1 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).

9See H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117
86 Stat 1523 (1972).
10 Missouri v. NOW, 958

ANTRausT & TRADE REG.

CONG.

REc. 35,815 (1971),

REP. (BNA) at F-1.

11 See Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289, 293-94 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd,
958 AiTrrraUST & TRADE Re. Rep. (BNA) F-1 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
12 Brief for Defendant at app. A, Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D.
Mo. 1979).
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cott was a combination in restraint of trade violating both section
I of the Sherman Act 1 3 and the Missouri antitrust statute 14; the
state also alleged that NOW's boycott constituted a tortious infliction of economic harm without legal justification or excuse.1 5
Finding for the defendant on all issues, the district court and the
court of appeals both read the Sherman Act as inapplicable to protest boycotts of the NOW variety. 6
The NOW boycott, although better organized and apparently
more effective than most, is a prime example of a protest boycott.
As this Comment defines that term, a "protest boycott" signifies
a concerted refusal to deal motivated by a political, social, religious,
or other noncommercial purpose.1 7 More precisely, the participants in a protest boycott lack, first, the commercial objective
to achieve an effect traditionally held violative of the Sherman Act,
such as monopolizing, raising prices, or excluding competitors from
a market. Second, they lack a significant business interest that
might be advanced by the boycotting activity.18 So defined, the
term "protest boycott" encompasses boycotts against offensive
products or services and against products and services not offensive
13 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Mo. EVv. STAT. §416.031.1 (1969).
1
5Missouri v. NOW, 958 ANTUST & TRADE REQ. lREP. (BNA) at F-7 to F-9.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977). The NOW case involves
issues of parens patriae standing and tort liability that are beyond the scope of this
Comment. For discussion of the parens patriae standing problem, see Curtis, The
Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant, 25 DEPAUL
L. REv. 895 (1976); Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge:
A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979). On the issue of
tort liability, see Sandifer & Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages: The New Threat to
Civil Rights Organizations,41 BnooxrYN L. REv. 559 (1975).
16 958 ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. BEP. (BNA) at F-i to F-2, F-9.
17 Boycott activity typically involves an agreement among individuals to follow
a particular course of action, such as terminating business relations with a designated
firm, as well as attempts to induce others to follow suit. See L. SuLravW', HANDBOOK OF TrE LAW OF ANTITnUST § 83, at 229-32 (1977); Political Boycott Activity,
supra note 7, at 659 n.4, 677. Especially in protest boycotts, inducement efforts
are likely to be more visible than the concerted refusal to deal. But for the purposes of this Comment, the term "protest boycott" shall be used to refer only to the
concerted refusal to deal itself, and not to the inducement activities that ordinarily
accompany it. When speaking of protest boycotts, it will be assumed that an
agreement among the boycotters exists sufficient to establish a "contract, combination
or conspiracy" under § 1 of the Sherman Act. For discussion of the problems that
arise in the protest boycott context in determining the presence of such an agreement, see note 162 infra.
is This definition does not foreclose the possibility of business firms engaging
in a protest boycott, provided that the boycotting businesses have no commercial
interest in the boycott's success. Professor Sullivan's hypothetical case of a consumer boycott instigated by a competitor of the target raises thorny problems that
need not be addressed here. See L. SuL=.wA, supra note 17, at § 92, at 262-65.
In addition, this Comment will not discuss the status of labor boycotts.
14
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in themselves but supplied or distributed by offensive parties or
by parties engaging in objectionable practices. It also includes
"secondary" boycotts against parties who are themselves neutral,
but who are associated in some way with the boycott's ultimate
target. 19
Many who are sympathetic to the goals of protestors and to
the need for a public airing of controversial issues naturally believe, along with the Eighth Circuit, that the antitrust laws simply
do not apply to protest boycotts. 20 This Comment will contend
in part I that the legal arguments advanced to support that view
are unconvincing and that no implied exclusion from the Sherman
Act for protest boycotts can be made out. In determining
whether a particular boycott violates the antitrust laws, however,
part II demonstrates that the standard employed should be the rule
of reason and not the per se rule of illegality ordinarily applied
to commercial boycotts. Although a protest boycott's noncommercial purpose cannot serve as a defense to a serious restraint of
trade under the rule of reason, in many cases a protest boycott's
purpose is predictive of a lack of significant anticompetitive effect,
and should therefore trigger a presumption of reasonableness.
19 By this definition, a consumer boycott protesting high prices would be a
protest boycott, but the Arab League's secondary boycott of foreign companies
trading with Israel would not, despite its political motivation. Under the terms of
the Arab boycott, companies wishing to deal with the Arab nations are prohibited
from dealing with Israel or with any firm having commercial relations with Israel.
This horizontal agreement is aimed not only at Israeli businesses but also at "Zionist
sympathizers," who may be competitors of the complying companies. Thus, firms
participating in the Arab boycott cannot be said to lack a significant business interest
in the boycott's success. See Note, The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of
United States v. Bechtel in Light of the Export Administration Amendments of
Other articles on the Arab boycott
1977, 92 HAZv. L. REv. 1440, 1446 (1979).
include Johristone & Paugh, The Arab Boycott of Israel: The Role of United States
Antitrust Laws in the Wake of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977,
8 GA. J. Ih'fL & CoMp. L. 661 (1978); Kestenbaum, The Antitrust Challenge to
the Arab Boycott: Per Se Theory, Middle East Politics, and United States v. Bechtel
Corporation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1411 (1976); Schwartz, The Arab Boycott and
American Responses: Antitrust Law or Executive Discretion, 54 TEx. L. Rev. 1260
(1976).
20 The antitrust laws on occasion have been used as a sword to attack noncommercially motivated exclusionary practices that threaten civil liberties. See, e.g.,
Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam)
(racially exclusionary real estate practices); Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 299
F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962) (blacklisting of "subversives" in the film industry); I.P.C. Distribs., Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture
Mach. Operators Local 110, 132 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (concerted refusal to
show "communist" film); United States v. Mortgage Conference, [1948-1949] Trade
Cas. (CCH) f 62,273 (S.D.NY. 1948) (consent decree) (discrimination on basis of
race and nationality in mortgage lending). See generally Marcus, supra note 6;
Note, "Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE L.J. 567 (1965). A commitment to civil liberties is thus not very
helpful in deciding whether the antitrust laws should apply to protest boycotts.
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I. THE

ARGUMENT FOR ANTITRUST EXCLUSION

A. The Noerr Doctrine
The court of appeals in NOW held that the convention boycotters were not liable under the antitrust laws because the boycott
lay outside the scope of the Sherman Act, 21 a decision based largely
on the authority of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.22 The Supreme Court had ruled in
Noerr that the antitrust laws did not apply to a lobbying and
publicity campaign by several railroads seeking legislation imposing
stricter governmental regulation of the trucking industry23 The
Court reached this decision even though the railroads' campaign
employed several unethical tactics and even though adoption of the
proposed legislation would have resulted in a serious restraint of
trade. Declining to decide whether the railroads' activities were
protected by the first-amendment right to petition, 24 the Court
instead gave a narrowing construction to the Sherman Act and
observed that a contrary interpretation would "raise important constitutional questions." 25 In effect, the Court recognized an implied
exclusion from antitrust regulation for lobbying activities.
Two arguments were advanced in support of the Noerr exclusion. First, the Court noted the "essential dissimilarity" between
"mere solicitation of governmental action" 26 and conduct traditionally prohibited by the Sherman Act, such as price-fixing and boycotts.2 7 Second, the Court emphasized that prohibitions of concerted lobbying activities would impair the proper functioning of
the democratic system by diminishing the ability of the electorate
to communicate its views to public officials.28

Thus, application of

the antitrust laws to joint lobbying efforts would be a mistake, for
it "would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not
business activity, but political activity." 29
21
Missouri v. NOW, 958 ANTrUST &
(8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
22365

U.S. 217 (1961).

TRADE BEG.

REP. (BNA)

F-I, F-9

For general discussions of the Noers decision, see

Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis
and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 80 (1977); Note,
Antitrust: The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine-Trucking Unlimited v. California
Motor Transport Company, 57 CA.w. L. EEv. 518 (1969); 33 RocKy MT. L. Rrv.
413 (1961).
23 365 U.S. at 138.

24 Id.132 n.6.
25 Id. 137-38.
26 Id. 138.
27 Id. 136.
28 1& 137.
29 Id,
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While extending Noerr's implied exclusion to cover attempts
to gain access to administrative agencies 30 and courts,31 as well as
attempts to influence the electorate 3 2 subsequent cases 33 have also
narrowed its reach.M Most recently, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,35 the Supreme Court cautioned that implied
exclusions, like the one inaugurated by Noerr, "have been unavailing to prevent antitrust enforcement which, though implicating...
fundamental [constitutional] policies, was not thought severely to
impinge upon them." 36
B. The NOW Opinion
Taking its cue from the Supreme Court in Noerr, the court of
appeals in NOW cast its holding in terms of the limited reach of
the Sherman Act. It began by setting out some congressional debates preceding adoption of the Sherman Act, conceded them to be
inconclusive, and concluded that at least the Act's legislative history
did not contain any affirmative indication of a congressional intent
to bring protest boycotts within the Act's scope.3 7 Turning to the
case law, the court noted several Supreme Court cases intimating
that the Sherman Act was meant primarily to regulate business, as
opposed to social or political activities. 38 But the bulk and chief
thrust of its opinion consisted of an unconvincing attempt to bring
the facts of NOW within the reach of the Supreme Court's decision
in Noerr.
The task was a difficult one. It is not easy to argue that a
boycott aimed at a state's convention industry is essentially similar
to a direct attempt to influence legislation. The Noerr Court,
emphasizing the "essential dissimilarity" between "mere solicitation
30 See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
3' See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508

(1972).

32
See Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n, 576
F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978) (attempts to secure legislation through voter initiative).
33
For a general discussion of subsequent cases, see Fischel, supra note 22, at
85-94.
34
See, e.g., Otter Tail Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973) (sham
exception); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513

(1972)

(sham exception); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad,

586 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 262 (1979); United
States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D.

Ga. 1979).
35435 U.S. 389 (1978).
3 Id.400.
37
Missouri v. NOW, 958

ANrrRUT & TRADE REc. REP. (BNA) F-1, F-2 to
F-6 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
38 Id.F-4 to F-5. See text accompanying notes 59-64 infra.
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of governmental action" and traditionally proscribed devices by
which the participants "give up their trade freedom, or help one
another to take away the trade freedom of others," 39 made specific
mention of boycotts as an example of the latter. Observing that all
of the evidence in the record concerned "the railroads' efforts to
influence the passage and enforcement of laws," the Noerr Court
noted in particular the lack of any "specific findings that the railroads attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the
truckers." 40 Nevertheless, the court of appeals insisted that under
Noerr, NOW's use of a boycott was irrelevant to the applicability
of the Sherman Act.41
The NOW court sought refuge in Noerr's treatment of the
railroads' unethical publicity campaign. In that case, the Supreme
Court concluded that the unethical and harmful aspects of the
campaign, waged against the trucking industry as a supplement to
the railroads' direct lobbying efforts, did not serve to bring the railroads' conduct within the ambit of the Sherman Act:
It is inevitable whenever an attempt is made to influence
legislation by a campaign of publicity, that an incidental
effect of that campaign may be the infliction of some direct
injury upon the interests of the party against whom the
campaign is directed.

.

.

.

To hold that the knowing

infliction of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal
would thus be tantamount to outlawing all such campaigns.42
Fixing on the convention boycott's goal of influencing legislative
action, the NOW court characterized the boycott as a political tool
for petitioning the government, essentially no different than the
publicity campaign in Noerr. Thus, whatever harm the boycott
caused to Missouri's convention industry was merely an incidental
effect of NOW's appeal to the legislature and did not subject NOW's
43
activities to antitrust coverage.
In another portion of its opinion rejecting the state's intentional tort claim, the court of appeals found NOW's boycott
privileged by the first amendment's right of petition.4 4 Its reason39
Eastern R.R. Presidents Con. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136 (1961).
40 Id. 142.
41 958 AN~rrusT & TRADE REG. EP. (BNA) at F-7.
42 365 U.S. at 143-44, quoted in Missouri v. NOW, 958 Arrn'usT & TRADE
BEG. REP. (BNA) at F-7.
43 958 ANTrrausT & TRADE B E. REP. (BNA) at F-7.
44 Id. F-7 to F-9.
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ing not altogether lucid, the court seems to have inferred from the
Supreme Court's avoidance of the first-amendment question in
Noerr that the activities depicted there actually enjoyed a constitutional privilege. Because the boycott in NOW differed only superficially from the railroads' activities in Noerr, according to the
court, it followed that the NOW boycott was likewise protected by
the first amendment. 45 Thus, although the court of appeals was
careful to present its resolution of the Sherman Act claim in terms
of the Act's intended scope, its holding as to the tort claim reveals
that caution to be a purely formal gesture; no matter what Congress
intended to include within the Sherman Act, the Eighth Circuit
would apparently hold practices like NOW's boycott immune to
governmental regulation by virtue of the first-amendment right
to petition.
It is not surprising that the court of appeals' opinion failed to
command unanimity. In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Gibson
took the majority to task for its lack of analysis. 46 Not persuaded
by the majority's attempt to obscure the difference between the
convention boycott and the solicitation efforts in Noerr, the dissenting judge emphatically denied that Noerr dictated the majority's
result. 47 He repeated the Supreme Court's recent reminder of the
heavy presumption against implied exclusions and of the necessity
of proving "countervailing policies which are sufficiently weighty to
overcome" it.4 8 Judge Gibson thus saw the court as obliged to
"undertake a more comprehensive balancing of the important
governmental interest in preserving the free enterprise system with
the interest of people to use this particular method of influencing
legislation." 49
The majority opinion of the court of appeals stands Noerr on
its head. Noerr established an implied exclusion for a certain form
of political activity--direct solicitation of legislative and executive
action-and held that activities taking that form lie outside the
Sherman Act even if the motivation for them is strictly anticompetitive and even if they are pursued in an unethical manner. It is
this focus on the form of the railroads' activity that explains the
451d. F-9.

46 Id. F-9, F-12 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
471d.

F-11.
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978).
49 958 ANrausT & TRADE REC. REP. (BNA) at F-11 (Gibson, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). Reluctant to venture such a balancing on his own, Judge
Gibson would have remanded to the district court with instructions for that under48

taking.
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Noerr Court's emphasis on the "essential dissimilarity" between
petitioning the government and trade practices like boycotts, traditionally thought to be anticompetitive. Had the Court in Noerr
thought motivation decisive, it could not have reached its result,
since the motivation of the railroads was conceded to be anticompetitive. Yet the holding of the court of appeals rests entirely on
the NOW boycott's motivation50 and views the difference in form
between a boycott and direct solicitation of the legislature as having
only a "superficial impact." 51 Where Noerr was careful to preserve
inviolate the traditional domain of antitrust enforcement, the NOW
court's interpretation would alter the entire landscape; every conceivable anticompetitive practice would be immunized from antitrust scrutiny, if only its goal was to exert an influence on the
52
government.
Even if one were to concede that the convention boycott
were entitled to some degree of protection by virtue of the firstamendment right to petition, it does not follow that any form of
governmental regulation is invalid. As the dissent correctly pointed
out, it was not sufficient for the court merely to find that antitrust
regulation of NOW's boycott would raise serious constitutional
questions. According to the City of Lafayette case, the court
needed to show that regulation would have "severely impinged"
53
upon the right to petition.
A general discussion of the possibility of implying an exclusion for protest boycotts from the antitrust laws grounded in the
first amendment will be taken up in a later section of this Comment.5 4 Here it suffices to say that the right to petition on which
50 See Missouri v. NOW, 958 Arrrnwus & TADE R. G. REP. (BNA) at F-7
& n.15 ("the crux of the issue is that NOW was politically motivated to use a
boycott to influence ratification of the ERA").
The extent of the circuit court's misunderstanding of Noerr, and first-amendment doctrine generally, is revealed by its argument based on the content of the
legislation sought by NOW as compared to that sought by the railroads in Noerr.
The court reasoned that because ratification of the ERA is political or social legislation, NOW's efforts to induce ratification lay further beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act than the railroads' efforts to secure commercial legislation harmful to
the trucking industry. It is precisely the significance of Noerr, however, that the
content of the legislation sought is irrelevant to the issue of Sherman Act coverage.
See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
139-40 (1961).
51958 ArNTusT &TRADE RBE. EP. (BNA) at F-7.
52 See, e.g., Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, No. 79-1086 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 21, 1980) (concerted closings by independent gas-station owners to protest
federal energy policies held symbolic speech directed at federal government and
thus protected from antitrust attack under Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
53 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978).
54 See text accompanying notes 81-98 infra.
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the circuit court relied has not received special treatment from
the Supreme Court, but rather has enjoyed equal status as a cognate
right along with the right to assemble peaceably, and to freedom
of speech and of the press. 5 Like those rights, the right to petition
is not absolute. As the Court held in a recent case involving the
right to petition, first-amendment rights are subject to regulation
that furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.5 6 Thus, characterizing NOW's boycott as an exercise of the right to petition does not automatically
render any government regulation unconstitutional. Rather, such
a characterization only triggers the need for a first-amendment
inquiry, an inquiry, Judge Gibson aptly noted, the NOW court
never began.
Before proceeding to analyze the first-amendment arguments
for keeping protest boycotts out of the Sherman Act, it will be
worthwhile to explore an alternative approach that figured in the
district court's treatment of the convention boycott in NOW. The
district court rested chiefly on the authority of Noerr, but sought
to buttress its opinion by stressing the boycott's noncommercial
character.57 Although the circuit court rejected this distinction as
a ground for its decision,58 one may still ask whether the noncommerical nature of protest boycotts in general suffices to establish an
implied exclusion from the federal antitrust laws.
C. Noncommercial Nature as a Basis for
Antitrust Exclusion
The decisions of several courts lend some support to the
proposition that the Sherman Act was simply not intended to reach
activities like protest boycotts, which have noncommercial objec55UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
The NOW court hinted at a greater protection for the right to petition than
for the right of free speech. In an effort to distinguish its former holding in Council
of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920), which found
a protest boycott of pro-German publications subject to antitrust sanctions, the court
of appeals reasoned that the earlier case involved political speech and not the right
to petition. Missouri v. NOW, 958 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at

F-2 n.4.
56 Brown v. Glines, 100 S. Ct. 594, 599 (1980).
57

Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289, 304 (W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd, 958
ANTrrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
58958 ANMrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at F-7 n.16. The court of

appeals distinguished cases holding boycotts subject to the Sherman Act despite
their noncommercial character and eschewed any reliance on the NOW boycott's

noncommercial nature, declaring: "Our decision is based upon the right to use
Id.
I..."
political activities to petition the government .
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9 the Supreme Court detives. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,5
scribed the Sherman Act as a law

enacted in the era of "trusts" and of "combinations" of
businesses and of capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the
marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public concern.
The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free
competition in business and commercial transactions
which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services .... 60
Years later, in a footnote to a leading boycott decision, Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,61 the Court construed Apex Hosiery
as having "recognized that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a
very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which
normally have other objectives." 62 Similarly, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled, in Marjorie Webster
Junior College v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc.,63 that the denial of accreditation to a junior
college by an association of colleges and secondary schools was not
a restraint of trade coming within the purview of the antitrust laws:
[T]he proscriptions of the Sherman Act were "tailored
. . . for the business world," not for the non-commercial
aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions.
In these contexts, an incidental restraint of trade, absent
an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of
sufficient to warrant application
the profession, is not
64
of the antitrust laws.
59310 U.S. 469 (1940).
60 Id. 492-93.
61359 U.S. 207 (1959).
621d. 213 n.7.

63432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
64 Id. 654 (quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Cort. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961)). See Donnelly v. Boston College, 558 F.2d 634, 635
(1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1977); Jones v. NCAA, 392
F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975). But see Council of Defense v. International
Magazine Co., 267 F. 390, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1920); Tondas v. Amateur Hockey
Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (hockey league's concerted refusal to
deal subject to antitrust laws despite noncommercial purpose).
The continuing validity of the learned-profession exemption relied on in
Mariorie Webster is questionable, however, in light of subsequent Supreme Court
decisions in which the Sherman Act was applied to restraints with allegedly non-
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Arrayed against these occasional qualifications, however, stands
a long line of cases giving the Sherman Act the broadest possible
reading, 65 and erecting a strong presumption against implied exclusions. 66 And, in fact, although both the Klor's footnote and
the Marjorie Webster decision emphasized the importance of noncommercial objectives, neither seriously suggested that a noncommercial objective would suffice by itself to establish an implied
exclusion from the Sherman Act. Both opinions implicitly required that the noncommercial objective involve an important
social policy-such as the policy favoring labor organization or
academic freedom-with which antitrust regulation would interfere.
As noted above, 67 the Supreme Court made this requirement explicit in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 68 Reaffirming the presumption against implied exclusions from the
Sherman Act, the Court declared that such exclusions were appropriate only when antitrust regulation would severely impinge
upon "policies of signal importance in our national traditions." 69
Can City of Lafayette and the line of precedent that it represents be distinguished? One might attempt to characterize this
extreme reluctance to sanction exclusions from the antitrust laws
as limited to situations involving economic actors engaged in economically motivated conduct-situations that contain a significant
danger of injury to competition. The logic of the Supreme Court's
decisions, according to this view, is that exceptions to antitrust
regulation allowing significant inroads on the national policy favoring free competition cannot be tolerated, unless in the name of
some other national policy of overriding importance. Given this
rationale, the argument continues, the strict view of antitrust
commercial purposes.

See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,

435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781 (1975);
see also Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148 (5th Cir. 1977) (questioning
validity of blanket educational exemption after Goldfarb).
65
See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (emphasis added):
The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these. . . . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims
of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.
See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978).
66 See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694,
719-20 (1975); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
67 See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
68435 U.S. 389 (1978).
69 Id. 400.
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exclusion reiterated in City of Lafayette cannot sensibly be applied
to protest boycotts. Composed of individual consumers and/or
noncommercial organizations and lacking any commercial objective, protest boycotts present a low risk of injury to competition
and ought, therefore, to be treated more favorably than those business combinations which the Sherman Act was primarily intended
to reach.
Although not without force, this argument cannot be reconciled with the counterexample of organized labor's experience
under the antitrust laws. Most labor-union activity no more
resembles the anticompetitive business practices the Sherman Act
was intended primarily to control than does the typical protest
boycott. Yet, the history of the labor-antitrust exemption provides
solid evidence of the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize an implied exclusion from the antitrust laws when that exclusion is
predicated solely on the "intended" scope of the Sherman Act and
not on any countervailing policies of special significance.7 0 In
Loewe v. Lawlor,71 the Supreme Court first ruled that labor unions
were subject to antitrust liability, declaring that the Sherman "act
made no distinction between classes. It provided that 'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was illegal." 72
Despite the attempt by Congress in the Clayton Act 73 in 1914 to
offer labor some protection, the Court in Duplex Printing Co. v.
Deering,74 read the statute narrowly and again applied antitrust
sanctions. 75 It was not until after Congress passed the NorrisLaGuardia Act 76 in 1932 that the Supreme Court finally recognized
an antitrust exemption for the efforts of labor unions.77 Even
this exemption has proven to be less than absolute, for there remain
70 For general discussions of the history of organized labor under the Sherman
Act; see Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 252 (1955); DiCola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Subsequent Meandering, 33 U. Prrr. L. lRzv. 705 (1972); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cin. L. Rev. 659 (1965); 61
ConNELr. L. REV. 436 (1976).
71208 U.S. 274 (1908).
72 Id. 301.
73 Ch. 323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 26
(1976)).
74254 U.S. 443 (1921).
75
See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274
U.S. 37 (1927); Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
70 Ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (1976)).
77
See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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situations in which the activities of labor organizations may be
78
subject to antitrust liability.
If, absent a strongly articulated, countervailing policy, the antitrust laws apply to the collective activities of individual "sellers of
labor," it is difficult to see why those same laws do not reach the
collective activities of individual consumers who marshall their buying power to wield influence in the marketplace.7 9 The history of
the labor cases under the Sherman Act, therefore, suggests that an
exclusion for protest boycotts will not be forthcoming unless it can
be shown that antitrust regulation would trench heavily upon a
countervailing policy of national importance.8 0 Because no congressional declaration favoring protest activity exists, the search for
such a policy turns next to the first amendment.
D. ProtestBoycotts and the First Amendment
An implied exclusion from the antitrust laws based on the first
amendment would require a finding of serious conflict between
78

Antitrust liability may still be found when labor organizations act in concert
with employers in a market-control scheme that would be proscribed for employers
acting without labor-union involvement. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 189
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). Antitrust liability may
also be found when labor unions engage in activities specifically proscribed by the
labor laws. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
79 Perhaps one could erect a distinction between labor and consumer activities
by reason of labor's greater economic muscle: because a firm's employees are ordinarily fewer, more concentrated, and more strategically located than the consumers
of its products, the employees are generally more capable of effective concerted
action. But such an attempt to exclude activities from antitrust scrutiny on the
basis of relative estimates of the likelihood of anticompetitive effect seems ill-advised.
Weighing the effect of certain practices on competition is an exercise more appropriate to antitrust analysis under the rule of reason. See text accompanying notes
145-59 infra.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), which held that consumers can
bring antitrust actions based on injuries to their pocketbooks, suggests another way
of looking at this issue. In Reiter, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that the antitrust laws reach only commercial injuries. Once harm to consumers' purchasing power is recognized as actionable under the antitrust laws, it
would indeed be anomalous if concerted use of that power were deemed to lie
beyond antitrust attack. The life of the law may not be logic, but symmetry should
not be sneezed at either.
80 The early cases subjecting labor organizations to antitrust regulation have
been criticized for applying a double standard to business and labor. See, e.g.,
Cox, supra note 70, at 256-66. Significantly, however, those cases have never been
overruled. Moreover, the labor-antitrust exemption more recently has received a
narrowing construction from the Supreme Court. See Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). Thus the exemption
from the antitrust laws which labor unions enjoy today extends no further than that
expressed in the statutes and implied as required to implement the national policy
in favor of collective bargaining.
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antitrust regulation and first-amendment freedoms. Two possible
sources of such a conflict can be identified. First, constitutional
protection might attach to the expressive aspect of the boycott itself,
that is, to the agreement among the boycott participants not to
deal with the target. Second, even if the first amendment does not
shield the concerted refusal to deal, antitrust regulation might unduly interfere with boycott-related publicizing activities of a type
entitled to first-amendment protection, such as distributing leaflets,
making speeches, holding rallies and marches, and buying advertisements.
This distinction between concerted refusals to deal, on the one
hand, and activities aimed at inducing third parties not to deal, on
the other, forms the foundation of a recent attempt, in a Harvard
Law Review Note, to analyze the status of politically motivated
boycotts under the first amendment.81 According to that Note, the
inducement efforts of protest boycotters are shielded by the first
amendment under the analysis typified by the Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburgv. Ohio,s 2 but concerted refusals to deal, in
light of United States v. O'Brien,83 are not.84
O'Brien involved the constitutionality of a federal regulation
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards. The defendant alleged
that the burning of his draft card was symbolic speech protected
by the first amendment, but the Supreme Court held that the defendant's activity entailed not merely speech, but speech plus conduct. The Court further held that governmental regulation of the
conduct in symbolic speech was justified if it advanced "an important or substantial governmental interest . . . unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." 85 Because antitrust regulation of
boycotts in general serves the important governmental interest of
enforcing a regime of competition, an interest "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression," antitrust regulation of protest boycotts, examined in light of the O'Brien analysis, does not run afoul
of the first amendment.
The analysis in O'Brien serves to distinguish those cases in
which the Supreme Court has extended the protection of free speech
81

See PoliticalBoycott Activity, supra note 7, at 679-87.

82395 U.S. 444 (1969).
83391 U.S. 367 (1968).
84 PoliticalBoycott Activity, supra note 7, at 679-87.

85 391 U.S. at 377.
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87
beyond merely verbal communication.88 Spence v. Washington,
which characterized as protected speech the displaying of an American flag with a peace symbol taped to it, and Buckley v. Valeo, 8
which held unconstitutional a federal law limiting political expenditures, are both examples of cases in which the questioned laws
violated the first amendment because the interests they served were
directly related to suppression of free expression. By contrast, the
interests served by the Sherman Act's ban on contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, relate only incidentally
to the silencing of free communication. 9
Employing the O'Brien test in this situation, however, seriously
understates the strength of the argument against according constitutional protection to protest boycotts. The governmental interest
supporting the regulation in O'Brien was chiefly bureaucratic, and,
as such, offered weak justification for restraining fundamental rights,
even if only incidentally. In contrast, the government's interest in
preserving competition is of major significance; 90 wherever the
antitrust laws apply, they invest individual businesses with impor86

See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HAv. L. REv. 1482 (1975);
Leahy, "Flamboyant Protest," The First Amendment and the Boston Tea Party, 36
BRooKLYN L. Rv. 185 (1970); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech?, 85 YArm L.J. 1001 (1976); Note, Student Expression on Campus and
Interference with the "Rights of Others," 51 DmN. L.J. 417 (1974).
87418 U.S. 405 (1974).
88424 U.S. 1 (1976).

89 Two decisions in the Fifth Circuit, Henry v. First Natl Bank, 595 F.2d 291
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980), and Machesky v. Bizzell,
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969), struck down on constitutional grounds injunctions
prohibiting picketing associated with civil rights boycotts. Although the Henry
decision might be read as extending first-amendment protection to a civil rights
boycott because of its lack of commercial purpose, that reading is too broad. In
that case, the district court had granted an order enjoining the enforcement of a
state antitrust judgment. The plaintiffs argued that the state law prohibited and
penalized activities that were protected by the first amendment. Appellate review
was limited to the question "whether the district court could . . . have found that
the . . . plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. .

.

. [The

court] intimate[d] no opinion regarding the ultimate merit of their contentions."
595 F.2d at 302. The court went on to say that "[gliven the procedural posture
of this case, we have no need and, hence, make no attempt to articulate a comprehensive scheme for reconciling a state's interest in regulating economic activity with
the First Amendments protection of political speech." Id. 304. Thus, the court
did not reach the question whether all protest boycotts are constitutionally protected.
Machesky considered the proper scope of a state court injunction where the
federal plaintiffs were engaging in boycotting and picketing. The court merely held
that the state court injunction was "constitutionally overbroad" because "it lumps
the protected with the unprotected." 414 F.2d at 291.
90 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct.
937, 946 (1980).
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tant economic rights. In United States v. Topco Associates,91 the
Court stated:
[The antitrust laws] are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to

compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
92
ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.

Unlike a draft-card burning, .which impinges merely upon the
government's interest in efficient administration, a protest boycott
seeks to apply economic coercion to the target business, and to interfere with its right to compete freely.
This coercive tendency of boycotts is of considerable importance in assessing the claim of first-amendment protection. Although the Supreme Court has often extended first-amendment pro93
tection to expression whose content offends or disturbs its audience,
it nevertheless has consistently upheld regulation when the form or
mode of the questioned expression, independent of its content,
threatens to interfere with the rights of others. 94 It therefore follows that, whatever the symbolic content of a concerted refusal to
deal, the coercive nature of that particular form of expression

renders it susceptible to regulation by the government.
The impulse to take protest boycotts out of the Sherman Act
probably derives not so much from solicitude for the symbolic message of concerted refusals to deal as it does from a sense that the
threat of antitrust liability will unduly chill the publicizing activities that ordinarily accompany a protest boycott. Indeed, in the
91405 U.S. 596 (1972).
92 Id. 610. Although the antitrust laws exist for the benefit of the public and
not, in the first instance, for the protection of businessmen, several of the Supreme
Court's boycott decisions demonstrate that "competition is not valued solely to advance consumer interests," but also "to protect the access of individual traders to
the market-place, free of coercion or restraint." L. SULLivAN, supra note 17, at § 84,
at 238 n.19 (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); and KIor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)).
93
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977);
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1975); Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
94 See, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). See
generally Levine, Should Civil Disobedience be Legalized? Reflections on Coercive
Protest and the Democratic Regime of Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 617, 617-22 (1977) (and
cases cited therein); Note, supra note 86, at 423-35.
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typical protest boycott, the expressive voice of the concerted refusal
to deal itself can hardly be discerned in the din of related speeches,
leaflets, marches, advertisements, and media coverage. One who
believes, with the commentator noted above, that such publicizing
efforts enjoy constitutional protection, might argue that even though
the first amendment does not protect concerted refusals to deal, the
latter should not be subjected to antitrust scrutiny, because to do so
would unduly encroach upon those accompanying activities.
Such an argument does not merit extended consideration. Although due regard for activities protected by the first amendment
will no doubt influence a court's handling of a protest-boycott
case, 95 there is no reason to think that the problems are insurmountable. In the labor context, for example, Congress has prohibited
secondary boycotts while preserving the right of labor organizations
to publicize the nature of the underlying dispute.m6 Thus, whether
or not publicizing activities in furtherance of a protest boycott are
protected by the first amendment, 97 they present no constitutional
impediment to including protest boycotts within the ambit of the
antitrust laws.
Practically speaking, of course, subjecting protest boycotts to
potential treble-damage liability and equitable sanctions under the
antitrust laws will doubtless act as a significant deterrent to groups
contemplating a protest boycott. Even if, as this Comment will
attempt to show in part II, most protest boycotts do not unreasonably restrain trade, the mere prospect of the costs involved in defending antitrust suits will exert a chill on protest-boycott activity.
While these consequences are troubling, it is hard to see how they
can alter the conclusion that under the existing case law, protest
boycotts do not qualify for an implied exclusion from antitrust
scrutiny. As the Supreme Court observed recently in rejecting a
different list of horribles: "These are not unimportant considerations, but they are policy considerations more properly addressed
to Congress .... " 98
95 In determining the existence of the concert of action necessary to a suit
under § 1 of the Sherman Act, for instance, courts may be led by first-amendment
considerations in protest-boycott cases to apply a different standard than they
would in an ordinary commercial context. See note 162 infra. First-amendment
overtones may also influence the decision whether to employ a per se or rule-ofreason approach. See text accompanying note 129 infra.
9629 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1976).
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964).
97
9

See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers

See text accompanying notes 160-67 infra.

8Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979).
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To argue that protest boycotts cannot under existing law be
excluded from the scope of the Sherman Act is not to say that they
violate the antitrust laws. Although the Sherman Act proscribes
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade," 99 this proscription has not been applied literally. Ever since
the decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,10 0 the Act has
been given force to prohibit only those agreements that impose an
unreasonablerestraint of trade. For determining which restraints
are unreasonable, courts have developed two complementary modes
of analysis. 1' 1 Under the rule-of-reason approach, competitive effect
of a restraint is examined in detail; the facts peculiar to the business, the nature of the restraint and its effects, the history of the
restraint, and the reasons for its imposition are all taken into consideration. 10 2 Under the per se rule, certain classes of restraints are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable because experience has
shown they have a high probability of causing deleterious effects on
competition. 10 3 Given these two modes of antitrust analysis, protest
boycotts can escape antitrust liability if the per se rule does not
apply to them, and if, when examined under the rule of reason
they are found to lack significant anticompetitive effects, thus qualifying as reasonable restraints of trade.
A. The Argument Against Per Se Treatment
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly listed group boycotts among the classes of restraints that should be governed by the
per se rule,1 4 lower federal courts have frequently decided boycott
09 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
100221 U.S. 1 (1911).
10 1 See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division (pts. 1-2), 74 YAi. L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373
(1966); Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUm. L. REv.
625 (1966); Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. 11Ev. 23
(1964); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. BEy. 1 (1977); Von Kalinowski, The Per Se
Doctrine-an Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. BEv. 569
(1964).
102 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918);
accord, National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978).
103 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50
(1977); Northern Pac. By. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
104 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);
KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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cases on the basis of rule-of-reason analysis.10 5 This situation has
prompted one commentator to quip that "[t]he law in Washington
. . * is quite different from the law in the rest of the country." 106
The problem, however, is not the lower courts' callous disregard
for the clear directives of the Supreme Court; rather, the problem
is that the Supreme Court's decisions applying the per se rule to
group boycotts have produced narrow holdings that leave ample
room for circumvention. 107
'
Yet it requires no effort at circumvention to argue that the Court's group-boycott decisions do not dictate
per se treatment of protest boycotts.
Protest boycotts are not the kind of boycotts that have traditionally elicited application of the per se rule. In Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-HaleStores, Inc., 08 for example, the Court found a per se
violation of the Sherman Act in a chain department store's use of
its buying power to cause manufacturers and distributors to refrain
from dealing with a competing, small retailer. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court stressed the distinction between those restraints whose legality was determined by the rule of reason and
those "restraints which from their 'nature or character' were unduly
restrictive, and hence forbidden by both the common law and the
statute." 109 In summarizing its previous cases, however, the Court
observed that "[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to
deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden
category." 110 The careful use of the term "trader" in conjunction
with the recognition in Klor's that the Sherman Act is concerned
only to a very limited extent with organizations having noncommercial objectives,1 1 ' is significant. Although the Court has never
squarely confronted a boycott, like a protest boycott, which did not
105 See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-91 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 546-47
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 262 (1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 132-33 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946
(1978); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d
119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76-80 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). For a general discussion of these and other cases,
see Bauer, supra note 6; McCormick, Group Boycott-Per Se or Not Per Se, That
Is the Question, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 703 (1976); Comment, supra note 6, at 818.
106 Woolley, supra note 6, at 774.
0 7
1
See McCormick, supra note 105, at 722-36; see also Bauer, supra note 6,
at 692. Bauer suggests that the Supreme Court's most recent decision touching on
boycotts, St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), foreshadows
a change in the broad scope of the per se rule for boycotts.
108359 U.S. 207 (1959).

109 Id. 211 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911)).

212 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).

130Id.
1
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at some level involve a refusal by traders to deal with other
traders,1 1 2 Klor's suggests that per se treatment would not be
appropriate.
It is not simply the absence of boycotters who are traders that
distinguishes protest boycotts from the group boycotts that have
been held to the per se standard. According to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, per se treatment is
appropriate only for those concerted refusals to deal that can be
properly termed "classic group boycotts":
The classic "group boycott" is a concerted attempt by
a group of competitors at one level to protect themselves
from competition from non-group members who seek to
compete at that level. Typically, the boycotting group
combines to deprive would-be competitors of a trade relationship which they need in order to enter (or survive
in) the level wherein the group operates." 5
Analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions invoking the per se rule
for group boycotts confirms that it is attempts by competitors to
exclude horizontal competitors which trigger the per se rule. 1 4 In
Klor's, for instance, the boycott organized by the chain department
store involved manufacturers and distributors and so had some
vertical elements. But it also had a strong horizontal component
since the concerted refusal was directed by one retailer against a
second retailer. Most protest boycotts, however, involve a concerted
refusal to deal by consumers at one level against sellers at another
level, and thus lack any horizontal component." 5
112 In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), the
Court held that a concerted refusal by certain insurance companies to deal with
customers of competing companies was a boycott subject to the antitrust laws.
Although the Court's opinion found no significance in the fact that the targets of
the boycott were consumers who were not in competition with the boycotters, the
Court declined to say whether the per se rule governs such a boycott. See
note 107 supra.
13 Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per se
treatment for NFL draft inappropriate) (citing L. SuLrvN., , supra note 17, at
232); accord, Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (9th
Cir. 1979); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 465 F. Supp.
665, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
14 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
(per se rule appropriate where retailers induced manufacturer not to sell to competing retailers); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (in
absence of conflicting governmental regulatory scheme, per se nile would have
applied to concerted refusal by traders against another trader); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (per se rule appropriate where
manufacturers induced retailers not to buy from other manufacturers). But see
Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 124-25
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974) (per se rule may be applied to
vertical combination to exclude competitors).
115 Some protest boycotts could be characterized as having a horizontal
element. For example, a boycott by white citizens of a real estate agent who
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Underlying this concern with the horizontal relationship between the parties involved in a group boycott is the Court's more
critical concern with the anticompetitive purposes and effects that
typically accompany horizontal restraints. Among the anticompetitive purposes and effects identified in the Court's boycott decisions are attempts to exclude competitors from competition, 116
attempts to maintain artificially high prices, 117 attempts to foster
monopoly conditions," 8 and attempts to coerce conformity to certain trade practices." 9 Lower courts, however, have often pointed
to the absence of some or all of these anticompetitive aims and
effects to justify discarding the per se rule and considering a given
boycott under the rule of reason. 20 In particular, a number of
courts have held that the per se rule is unwarranted where the
boycotters lack commercial motives 12 or act in furtherance of some
22
public policy.
refused to steer blacks away from white neighborhoods, although focused on the
agent, would really be aimed at the class of prospective black buyers. Even here,
however, the lack of a commercial objective is reason enough to dispense with
per se treatment. See text accompanying notes 123-32 infra.
116E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); Fashion
See generally
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
Bauer, supra note 6, at 686-92; McCormick, supra note 105, at 722-36.
1 E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966).
118 E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 9, 13 (1945).
119E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 144 (1966);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 (1961)
(per curiam); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
120 See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530,
546-47 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 262 (1979); Oreck Corp. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 132-33 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 946 (1978); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1977); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71, 76-78 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Optivision,
Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping Center Assocs., 472 F. Supp. 665, 676 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 822-30.
121 See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977);
Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199, 1207 (E.D.
Mich. 1973); Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1247,
It is also possible to read National Soc'y of Pro1253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
fessional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978), as implying the
propriety of rule-of-reason analysis where the concerted activity has an allegedly
noncommercial objective. The Court, never once mentioning the term "per se,"
fails to explain why it applies the rule of reason when the lower courts found the
activity illegal per se. See United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs,
See also
555 F.2d 978, 983-84 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
L. SuLmavAN, supra note 17, at § 92, 261-65.
122 See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1963);
America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328,
334 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
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Consistent with the rationale of these cases, protest boycotts
should be treated under the rule of reason. In most instances they
will lack both the purpose and effect of inhibiting competition.
By definition, protest boycotters do not have traditional commercial
objectives,123 so there is no danger that concerted pressure might
be exerted for the purpose of accomplishing an anticompetitive
end, such as excluding a competitor or monopolizing a market.
In many cases the purpose of a protest boycott will be to further a
public policy, such as preventing race discrimination in hiring124
or discouraging the sale of an "alcoholic beverage" to minors. 25
The effect of a protest boycott on competitive conditions will
almost always be incidental, and even that assumes the boycott can
muster sizeable public support for a long enough period of time. 12
Such minimal effects do not justify placing protest boycotts as a
class in the per se category. As the Supreme Court recently noted:
"Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to
conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." 127 Finally, the symbolic element in protest boycotts, although not sufficient to qualify
them for the protection of the first amendment, 2 8 surely serves to
distinguish such boycotts from practices lacking "any redeeming
virtue." 120
The novelty of antitrust prosecutions against protest boycotts
is another factor bearing on the appropriateness of per se or rule-ofreason treatment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed
the principle that per se rules should not be applied in novel situations in which experience has not shown the manifestly anticompetitive character of a particular type of restraint. 13 0 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adhered to this principle in
Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc. 13 1
In that case, the circuit court refused to apply the per se rule to a
bylaw in a national bank-credit-card system which prohibited cer23

See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
E.g., Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct 1020 (1980).
125 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1978, at 38 (nurses association urges boycott of
new soft drink containing 0.5% alcohol).
12G See text accompanying notes 159-60 infra.
127Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
128 See text accompanying notes 81-98 supra.
12 9
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
130 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1979);
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
11485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
2

124
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tain member banks from membership in competing credit-card
systems. The court noted that the bylaw constituted a group boycott,13 2 but held that per se treatment was inappropriate because
courts lacked sufficient experience with the bank-credit-card industry and the specific bylaw in question. Protest boycotts, having
noncommercial objectives and lacking intercompetitor relationships, pose an even more novel situation than that involved in the
Worthen Bank case. Indeed, no court has ever decided whether
such boycotts should be treated under the per se rule. The novelty
of this issue thus dictates that per se treatment of protest boycotts
would, at least initially, be inappropriate.

B. Protest Boycotts Under the Rule of Reason
The rule of reason does not offer a precise and well-defined
model of analysis. 133 Courts are given little guidance other than
a mandate to examine all the relevant circumstances surrounding
the challenged restraint. If this inquiry reveals significant anticompetitive effects or an unlawful purpose, the restraint is declared
illegal. Otherwise, no antitrust violation is established.'m Given
vague terms such as "significant anticompetitive effect" and "surrounding circumstances," it is difficult to predict how courts will
regard particular restraints. Nevertheless, several general principles can be identified.

1. Noncommercial Purpose as an Excuse
One method for effecting an accommodation under the rule of
reason between the antitrust laws and protest activities would be to
allow a noncommercial objective to be treated as a counterweight
to any negative impact a protest boycott exerts on competition.
That notion, however, appears to have been scotched at an early
date by Justice Brandeis, in his classic formulation of rule-of-reason
analysis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.135 After stat132 Id. 125; accord, Optivision, Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping Center Assocs., 472
F. Supp. 665, 675 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
133 "The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is
little more than a euphemism for nonliability." Posner, supra note 101, at 14.
134 See National Soc'y of Professional Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
.1246 U.S. 231 (1918).

PROTEST BOYCOTTS

1155

ing that the true test of a restraint's legality is its effect on competition considered in light of all the relevant facts, he observed:
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences. 86
Accordingly, the purpose for which a restraint is imposed can only
be considered as evidence of the restraint's probable effect on competition. Courts are not at liberty to consider whether the purpose
motivating a restraint is of sufficient social value to excuse its effects.
Only recently, this conception of the rule of reason was reaffirmed
in National Society of ProfessionalEngineers: :13 "[T]he purpose of
the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance
of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest . . . . Subject to exceptions
defined by statute, that policy decision has been made by the
Congress." 138
Professor Coons, whose argument in favor of a justifying role
for noncommercial purpose predates Engineers, has insisted that
such pronouncements do not dictate a like result for protest boycotts. 3 9 He would distinguish the precedents as uniformly involving the conduct and purposes of businessmen. Because the businessman's purpose is invariably economic, the Court has wisely
considered purpose to be irrelevant; no matter how honorable the
motives advanced in litigation, it is assumed that the search for
higher profits is the true determinant of business behavior. In this
regard, Professor Coons finds instructive the Supreme Court cases
establishing labor's nonstatutory antitrust exemption. Confronted
with recurring scenarios in which noncommercial purposes dominated and assumptions about business behavior did not apply, the
Court was compelled to acknowledge a justificatory role for non136 Id. 238.
Professor Sullivan points out that Justice Brandeis did not
practice what he preached in Chicago Board of Trade, the case having been decided
largely on the basis of the social value of the defendants' purpose and not on the
basis of the restraint's effect on competitive conditions. L. SuLuv.s, supra note 17,
at § 66, 175-79.

137 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
13s Id. 692 (footnote omitted).
139 Coons, supra note 5, at 726-29, 746-54.
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commercial purpose. In protest boycotts, he concludes, noncommercial purpose should serve as an excuse for deleterious effects on
competition, provided that the purpose of the boycott accords with
an affirmative public policy. 140
Professor Coons is partly correct when he observes that the
special treatment accorded to labor unions can be explained by the
noncommercial purpose of labor activities. But his conclusion by
no means follows. The method chosen by the Supreme Court for
accommodating antitrust and labor policies has been to create an
implied exemption for certain labor activities. 4 1 If the analogy to
labor activities is a good one, then it would seem that protest boycotts should also be placed beyond the reach of the antitrust laws.
For the reasons set forth in part I of this Comment, however, no
such immunity can be maintained, a conclusion which Professor
Coons accepts.

1 42

The difference between excluding protest boycotts from antitrust scrutiny altogether and letting noncommercial purpose in as a
justification is not a meaningless one. Limiting rule-of-reason
analysis to the competitive significance of a given restraint makes
good sense. Although in a common-law-tort or conspiracy action
courts are permitted to evaluate the social worth of the boycotters'
objective, 143 the antitrust laws were designed to protect competition.
The Sherman Act was not intended to provide a forum for deciding
which forms and purposes of social and political protest are sufficiently weighty to justify the use of some degree of coercion. Any
attempt by courts to decide antitrust boycott cases on a basis other
than competitive effect would be likely to produce unprincipled
140 Id.
748-54. See also Bauer, supra note 6, at 701-02. Professor Bauer
argues that Engineers is a price-fixing case and so distinguishes it from boycott

cases where the societal benefit of the restraint should be considered. This distinction, however, does not answer the Court's argument that the Sherman Act
was designed to protect a regime of competition and does not allow judges to
consider other factors not sanctioned by statute. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 694-96.
141 Some labor activities are still subject to antitrust liability, despite their
noncommercial purpose. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
142

Coons, supra note 5, at 706-07.

143 See, e.g., Radio Station KFH Co. v. Musicians Ass'n, 169 Kan. 596, 220
P.2d 199 (1950) (concerted refusal to deal justified by public policy favoring

labor organization); Rosman v. United Strictly Kosher Butchers, 164 Misc. 378, 298
N.Y.S. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (purpose of preventing misrepresentation held to
justify picketing by orthodox Jewish butchers of competing, not-strictly-kosher
butcher). See generally Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause
of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1957);

Stevens, Interference with Economic

Relations-Some Aspects of the Turmoil in the Intentional Torts, 12 OsGOoDnE HALL
L.J. 595 (1974).
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decisions, guided solely by the policy preferences of individual
judges.'"
2. Noncommercial Purpose as Evidence of Probable Effects
Although a noncommercial purpose may not, consistently with
precedent and sound policy, be considered a justification for anticompetitive effects, it can be used as evidence of the likelihood of a
protest boycott's effect on competition. As the Court reiterated in
Engineers, "competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing
the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed." 145
Analysis of the purposes motivating protest boycotts leads to
the conclusion that many, though not all, should enjoy a presumption of reasonableness. By definition, a protest boycott lacks
a traditional commercial objective, such as excluding competitors or
fixing prices, so that the anticompetitive effects, if any, that such a
boycott might cause are incidental to the reasons for its imposition.
These incidental and unintended effects on competition are not
likely to rise to a significant level, and do not provide a basis for
treating protest boycotts as unreasonable restraints of trade.
It is true, of course, that the immediate object of a protest
boycott is to exert economic pressure on the target business, but
it is not true that every injury sustained by the target as a result of
a protest boycott is an injury to competition subject to antitrust
sanctions. The antitrust laws are designed to protect competition,
not competitors. 146 Before a protest boycott can be found unreasonable, the target business must show that the boycott causing its
losses was one having significant anticompetitive effects. It will
not be enough for the target merely to show that it has suffered
144 Professor Coons, for example, would allow a boycott's purpose to serveas
justification only if it is "a specific object of policy," and not if the purpose is an
unlawful one or one to which the law is indifferent. Coons, supra note 5, at 748-49.
It might be contended that so long as a court observes Professor Coons's categories,
it would be upholding the reasonableness of the boycott not according to its own
policy preferences, but according to legislative decisions. The problem with this
reasoning is that it allows a court to use an antitrust action to "try" the plaintiffs
for violations not related to the Sherman Act. See Fashion Originators' Guild of
America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (rejecting argument that boycott coulc
be justified by a purpose to prevent tortious conduct).

145 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688

(1978) (emphasis added).
146 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). See note 157 infra.
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losses as a result of a boycott, even though the boycott is a form
of restraint typically condemned in commercial contexts as unreasonable.
A common form of boycott, both in the commercial and the
protest arenas, will serve to illustrate this point. A commercial
boycott that seeks not to drive the target out of business altogether, but only to persuade it to terminate certain objectionable
practices, such as discount pricing or free servicing, is anticompetitive because, if successful, the target will either go out of business
or agree to observe anticompetitive restraints. If the target resists
and is excluded from the market, any business that seeks to
replace it will face the same choice. Thus, the boycott portends
a permanent lessening of competition by extinguishing certain
forms of competitive business practice.
In contrast, a protest boycott focusing on objectionable conduct of the target, such as racial discrimination 147 or a particular
advertising campaign, 148 presents no such anticompetitive dilemma.
If the target complies and desists from the irritating practices, competition will not be injured because the practices are only indirectly, if at all, related to competition. If, on the other hand, the
target resists and goes out of business, a firm replacing it in the
market can choose to comply without any adverse effects on the
structure of competition. In either event, any injury suffered by
the target as a result of this type of protest boycott does not flow
from a restraint on competition, but rather from the target's insistence on, and the boycotters' reaction to, conduct that is only
remotely related to any competitive advantage. 149
147

E.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).

148 E.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1977, at 21, col. 4 (boycott of Florida citrus
products in opposition to use of Anita Bryant, the anti-gay crusader, as advertising
personality).
149 According to this analysis, whether the presumption of reasonableness attaches depends upon the nature of the practices which are thought to be offensive.
When the practices of the target business to which the boycotters object are competitive ones, the presumption would not apply. For example, if in order to protect
the jobs and communities of American garment workers, a consumer boycott sought
to prevent a retail men's clothing store from selling imports at a sharp discount, the
boycott's goal, even though noncommercially motivated, would herald anticompetitive effects. Likewise, a protest boycott seeking to lower prices rather than to raise
them would not be presumptively reasonable, since its goal is to restrain competitive
pricing. This is not to say, however, that such boycotts are unreasonable restraints
of trade; as developed in the following section, most protest boycotts are too sporadic
and too weak to have the substantial impact on competition that a finding of unreasonableness requires. See text accompanying notes 159-60 infra. Moreover,
protest boycotts aimed at practices closely related to competitive conditions may
also have procompetitive aspects offsetting any anticompetitive effects.
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A second type of protest boycott, illustrated by the NOW
case, targets strategically situated businesses, or an entire industry,
as a means of pressuring a governmental body to adopt specified
measures.15 0 The businesses selected may have done nothing to
merit this unfortunate treatment and may not even be in a posidon to influence the desired governmental action. They are, in
effect, held hostage. Although the secondary nature of such
boycotts raises questions of fairness that may be relevant to state-law
tort claims,' 6 ' looked at solely in terms of the effect on competition, these boycotts are not inherently anticompetitive. Like "practice" boycotts, they do not seek to impose anticompetitive conditions on the targets, nor will acquiescence by the governmental
body entail any impairment of competition. Similarly, boycotts of
Iranian 52 or, in an earlier day, Egyptian 153 goods, based on patriotic perceptions of foreign affairs, although perhaps effecting a
temporary distortion of the markets for those goods, cannot be said
in any meaningful sense to signal a significant lessening of competition.
Often protest boycotts are directed at products or services
thought to be offensive, such as "unpatriotic" publications15 4 or
"radical" films. 55 Insofar as such boycotts aim permanently to
exclude from the marketplace a particular product or service,
their objective may be characterized as anticompetitive in nature,
even if their motivation is not. Similarly, a consumer boycott
seeking to exclude members of a certain race is anticompetitive
because it promises to erect permanent barriers to entry. 56 When
the goal of the protest boycott is the exclusionary one of restricting
the range of choices available to consumers, it is hard to see how
150 See, e.g., Henry v. First Nat Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
151

See generally Sandifer & Smith, supra note 15.

152 E.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1979, at 2 (refusal of dockworkers to unload

Iranian goods).
'53 E.g., Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.
1960) (per curiam) (refusal to unload Egyptian ship in retaliation for Arab boycott
of American ships trading with Israel).

154 E.g., Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th
Cir. 1920).
1S E.g., I.P.C. Distribs., Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators
Local 110, 132 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Il. 1955).
3SO Cf. Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967)
(per curiam) (conspiracy of white realtors to exclude blacks from renting or owning
in white neighborhoods).
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the boycott's concededly noncommercial motivation could make
any difference to the calculus of competitive effect. This type of
boycott should not, therefore, enjoy a presumption of reasonableness, although it might be that exclusion of a single product or race
from the marketplace would be viewed as an insignificant restraint
on competition 57 and a not unreasonable one. 58
3. The Market Power of Protest Boycotts
To predict the effect on competition of a protest boycott,
courts will be obliged to inquire into the boycott's market power
over time. 5 9 If the boycott is of a type whose purpose suggests
anticompetitive effects, as outlined in the preceding section, then
the greater its market power, and the longer it continues, the
greater the chance that it will succeed in significantly disrupting
competition. As a practical matter, however, it seems improbable
that many protest boycotts will be found to satisfy these conditions.
Most protest boycotts are ad hoc, short-lived affairs, which ride
the crest of a wave of public indignation. To be effective, protest
boycotts must win the support of a broad range of consumers, a
difficult if not largely impossible task. To the extent that they
are organized at all, protest boycotts are directed by loose and unstable confederations of nonprofit groups, often lacking in the financial resources or the know-how necessary to sustain an effective
campaign. Moreover, protest boycotts are easily co-opted; unlike
commercial boycotts, protest boycotts often have vaguely defined
demands, and conciliatory efforts by the targeted businesses or concerned public officials may serve to dissipate the boycotts' support.
And once dissolved, protest boycotts are difficult to reactivate. For
157 In Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), the

district and circuit courts had found that a combination to exclude a single appliance
retailer did not violate the Sherman Act because many other competitors were in
the market and no injury to competition had been shown.

The Supreme Court

reversed, holding group boycotts to be per se violations of the Act, not requiring
proof of anticompetitive injury. Although Kior's appears to stand for the proposition

that exclusionary conduct violates the Act, no matter how insignificant its impact on
competition, the breadth of the decision has been questioned. See L. Su.r.avA,
supra note 17, at § 84, at 236.

More significantly, Klor's itself contains language

indicating that similar activities by nontraders should be treated more leniently. See
text accompanying note 62 supra. Thus, Klor's would not be controlling in a protestboycott case.
158 If a benign purpose may not serve to justify a restraint on competition, see
text accompanying notes 135-44 supra, it seems inescapable that a maleficent purpose, such as racial discrimination, should not serve to condemn a boycott that is
harmless from an antitrust point of view.
159 See L. SuLvAsN, supra note 17, at § 69, 189-92; Bauer, supra note 6, at

711-12.
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all these reasons, protest boycotts are unlikely to exert any lasting,
significant effect on competition.
C. The Scope of Liability
According to the preceding analysis of protest boycotts under
the Sherman Act, most protest boycotts are entitled to a presumption of reasonableness because their purposes indicate the improbability of significant anticompetitive effects; other protest boycotts,
although not presumptively reasonable, are nevertheless likely to
have but a slight impact on competition because of the nearly insurmountable problems of organization implicit in the noncommercial setting. To say that the probability of finding an "unreasonable" protest boycott is slim is not, however, to say that none
will occur. When the occasion arises, a court will have to face
remedial problems of some difficulty.
A recent Note in the Harvard Law Review 160 maps a course
through this thicket which, if reliable, would maximize the constitutional protection afforded to protest boycotts while minimizing
the scope of relief available to businesses injured by them. The
authors of that Note draw a constitutional line between efforts of
boycotters to induce allegiance to the boycott, and the concerted
refusal to deal itself. The former they find protected by the first
amendment, the latter not. Reasoning that "[liability cannot, consistently with the first amendment, extend to the patronage withheld by parties who were only induced or persuaded not to deal," 161
they conclude that damages can only be awarded for the loss of the
patronage of those boycotters who expressly commit themselves to
the concerted refusal. 162 Although they do not discuss it, presum160 Political Boycott Activity, supra note 7. Although the Harvard Note is not
specifically addressed to cases arising under the Sherman Act, its analysis would
seem to apply equally to federal as well as state antitrust actions.
A detailed consideration of the problem of assessing damages caused by an
unreasonable protest boycott is beyond the scope of this Comment See generally
II P. AREzDA & D. Tum-,m, ANTrRUsT LAW ff 9 331-32, ff 343, at 227-34 (1978);
Parker, Economics in the Courtroom: Proof of Damages in a Price-Fixing Case, 9
ANTIEEusT L. & EcoN. Rsv. 61 (1977); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions:
Do They Work?, 61 Gum. L. 1Ev. 1319 (1973); Symposium, Proof and Disproof
of Damages in Private Litigation, 36 Axrra usT L.J. 149 (1967).
161 PoliticalBoycott Activity, supranote 7, at 690.
16 2 The Harvard Note finds the behavioral assumptions underlying the traditional conspiracy theories employed in antitrust cases inapplicable to protest boycotters, and would require conspiracy to be proved by "direct evidence of an express
agreement." Id. 689. In traditional antitrust analysis, proof of an agreement can
be established in three different ways: (1) by evidence of an express agreement,
see, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); (2) by
evidence of an agreement implied from a common pattern of conduct, see, e.g.,
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948); or (3) by
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ably the Harvard authors would also restrict injunctive relief to
prohibitions against express agreements, and would label any attempt to enjoin continued inducement activities a violation of the
first amendment.
One need not ponder this argument very long to discover its
flaw. Assuming that the Note is correct in thinking that persuasion
or inducement activities, without more, are protected by the first
amendment, it hardly follows that those activities retain their constitutional mantle when they form an integral part of an illegal
concerted refusal to deal. On more than one occasion, the Supreme
Court has observed that conduct otherwise protected by the first
amendment loses its protective shield if undertaken in furtherance
of an illegal scheme. 163 Thus, if the protest boycott is illegal, there
is no constitutional barrier to holding conspirators liable for losses
evidence of interdependent behavior, i.e., conscious, parallel action which would not
be undertaken without a mutual understanding that all the actors will follow the
same course, see, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27
(1939). See generally Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. Rlxv.
919 (1976); Posner, A Programfor the Antitrust Division, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 500,
514-25 (1971); Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
The Harvard authors would thus disallow a finding of conspiracy based on an
implied agreement or on "conscious parallelism." They explain that in the commercial context it is reasonable to assume that participants in an alleged boycott
would not limit their trade freedom without assurances that others will do likewise.
But in the protest-boycott setting, they point out, it is just as likely that individuals
will refuse to deal as a matter of principle, without regard for the course others
pursue. It follows that only evidence of an express agreement will do. The Harvard
authors even go so far as to state that it would be "improper" for courts to infer
that the organizers of a protest boycott have themselves agreed to participate in it.
Id. 689 n.153.
This argument is more than a little disingenuous. Granting the correctness of
distinguishing between the behavioral assumptions appropriate to the commercial
and noncommercial contexts, it surely does not follow that the only possible solution
is to deprive courts of the power to draw plain inferences from the facts. A requirement of conspiracy is not unique to antitrust violations, and, in other areas of the
law where commercial motives play no part, the ability to imply an agreement has
necessarily been recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st
Cir. 1969). A conspiracy law that requires "direct evidence of an express agreement" is really no law at all.
It is not hard to understand why the Harvard authors might have felt compelled to assume such an unreasonable position. The danger to be avoided, of
course, is a finding of the concert of action required under § 1 of the Sherman Act
based solely on evidence of inducement activities protected by the first amendment.
One who does no more than sign a newspaper ad or speak at a boycotters' rally
should not have to fear treble-damage liability. Cf. United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969) (antiwar "conspiracy" to counsel, aid and abet draft
resistance). Yet, courts are not so heedless of first-amendment concerns that their
hands must be tied by the extreme standard of proof urged by the Harvard Note.
Allowing conspiracy to be demonstrated by implied agreements will do no harm,
provided that courts pay due respect to the first amendment.
163 California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514-15
(1972); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 501-04 (1949).
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due to the withdrawal of patronage by nonconspirators. 1'
Nor
would there be any constitutional difficulty in enjoining the conspirators from engaging in further acts of inducement. Rejecting a
first-amendment attack on the scope of injunctive relief in National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,16 5 the Supreme
Court observed: "While the resulting order may curtail the exercise
of liberties that the Society might otherwise enjoy, that is a necessary and, in cases such as this, unavoidable consequence of the
violation. .

.

.

The First Amendinent does not 'make it .

impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of
trade. .
' 1.6
The approach of the Harvard authors would indeed make it
impossible to enforce the antitrust laws. Although they concede
that a politically motivated concerted refusal to deal may 15e outlawed without abridging constitutional rights, their view of the first
amendment would deny effective sanctions to successful plaintiffs.
Without a damage award commensurate with the injury inflicted,
or injunctive relief against the defendants' ongoing solicitation
activities, a finding of illegality would have little or no effect on the
continuing harm which the Sherman Act proscribes. The point is
not that a violation of the Act renders the first amendment a nullity
-surely remedial steps should be as little restrictive of constitutional
164But see Henry v. First Natl Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 302-05 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980).
The ordinary difficulty of proving damages would remain. Liability for injury
attributable to nonconspirators would require a finding of causal connection between
the proscribed activities of the conspirators and the independent actions of the
nonconspirators responding to inducement. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-OMat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the Court noted that the plaintiff in an antitrust
suit must "prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the
market Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful." Id. 489. Actord, Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); American Infra-Red
Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 3610 F.2d 977, 996 (8th Cir. 1966). Thus,
the plaintiff would have to show, first, that loss of the nonconspirators' patronage
was actually caused by the inducement activities of the conspirators and, second,
that the inducement was itself an antitrust violation. Neither requirement poses
serious obstacles. The causation element would be no more difficult to satisfy than
usual; the conspirators would be held responsible for the predictable, intended
consequences of their conduct. As for the second requirement, in most instances,
inducement activities will be centrally organized and themselves the subject of
express or implied agreement. Conceivably, a conspirator might be able to present
convincing evidence that he undertook inducement efforts solely on his own initiative,
but such cases are likely to be rare.
165435 U.S. 679 (1978).
166Id. 697 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502
(1949)). But see Henry v. First Natl Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 302-05 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980) (affirming injunction against enforcement of
overbroad state antitrust decree on first-amendment grounds).
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liberties as possible.167 But relief must be afforded so as to effectuate the purposes of the antitrust laws.
CONCLUSION

The increasing frequency of antitrust challenges to protest boycotts presents difficult problems of legal analysis. In an attempt to
apply existing case law to those problems, this Comment began by
asking whether protest boycotts qualify for an implied exclusion
from the Sherman Act. An initial examination of the opinion of
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Missouri v. National
Organization for Women,'68 found its reliance on Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.169 to be misplaced. The remaining sections of part I concluded that neither
the noncommercial objectives of protest boycotts nor their character
as symbolic speech suffice, under current Supreme Court doctrine,
to carve out an exemption from the antitrust laws. Part II found
ample precedent for scrutinizing protest boycotts under the rule of
reason, rather than disposing of them in accordance with the per se
treatment normally accorded to group boycotts. It rejected as unsound the argument that the noncommercial purpose of protest
boycotts should be permitted to justify the restraints they impose
on competition. Considered as evidence of probable effect, however, noncommercial purpose was shown to provide a guide for
determining which types of protest boycotts are likely to lack any
significant effect on competition. According to this analysis, the
purpose of some protest boycotts was thought to indicate a potential
for serious restraints of trade, but part II found little reason to expect those or any protest boycotts to be capable of mustering the
necessary market power. Were a protest boycott to be held unreasonable, however, this Comment argued that the first amendment
would present no obstacle to effective relief.
Putting the precedents to one side, what legal status should
protest boycotts have with respect to the Sherman Act? Although
the matter is surely open to dispute, an initial premise would be
that in a modern, democratic society, the collective use of economic
coercion carries a presumption of the need for close governmental
supervision. A noncommercial motivation for the organized use of
167 See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,

697-99 (1978).
168 958 ANTITRUST & Tna.DE REG.

169 365 U.S. 217 (1961).

REP. (BNA) F-1 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
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such force should not outweigh that presumption, because it is the
existence of unbridled power, and not the ends for which it is
exercised, that necessitates governmental control. 7 0 Nor does the
fundamental right of free expression counsel otherwise. Whatever
social utility protest boycotts have is in their ability to express in a
symbolic form the strongly held belief of the boycotters. But as the
anticompetitive effects caused by a boycott increase, the boycott's
value as a mode of expression is at some point outweighed by its
interference with the conflicting value of the right of businesses to
compete freely. Thus, sound public policy dictates that a balance
be struck, preserving the expressive worth of protest boycotts, while
at the same time keeping within bounds the harm they cause to
competition.
170

See Bird, supra note 6, at 259-60.

